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Introduction 
Economists usually sing with the same nose when they answer questions about the 
role of technology in economic growth. They generally agree that sustained long-
term growth in productivity, which began in Western Europe some two centuries 
ago, could not have been maintained in an environment of stagnant production 
technologies. Whether we consult Karl Heinrich Marx, Joseph Alois Schumpeter or 
Robert Merton Solow, the answer is the same: new technologies are the source of 
long-term economic growth. Economists, as we know, usually argue that the 
production and utilization of new technologies depend critically on appropriate 
social institutions, such as competition, decentralized markets, secure property 
rights, enforceable contracts, and norms of trust and reciprocity. Yet virtually no one 
argues that long-term growth in output per worker is possible in an economy with 
stationary production techniques.2 
In his pioneering contribution to modern (neo-classical) growth theory, Solow (1956; 
1957) uses the letter  to represent technology. Specifically, in Solow-type growth 
models the letter  symbolizes the stock of technology, which for convenience is 
assumed to increase with time at a fixed rate. If the exogenous increase in  is 
assumed to be labor saving, it means that technical change makes it possible to 
produce a given level of output by using fewer labor units than before and the same 
amount of capital. In equation (1) , average output per capita for an economy, is a 
function of the state of technology, , and the ratio of capital to labor, : 
     (1) 
                                                 
1  Thráinn Eggertsson is a Professor at the Iceland School of Business, University of Iceland, 
and a Global Distinguished Professor, Department of Politics, New York University. The 
Paper was presented at the symposium in honour of Professor Gudmundur Magnusson, 
University of Iceland, Reykjavik, November 2007. 
2  Growth laggards are of course able to increase output per worker by simultaneously 
reforming their social institutions and obtaining foreign technologies from abroad. Long-
term growth, however, requires new additions to the stock of existing knowledge and 
technologies.  
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In any time period, t, output per unit of labor, , is determined by the value of the 
capital-labor ratio, . Note that  is fixed as well as the technical parameter , 
which is a positive fraction. With  and  given, there exists an optimal value for  
that maximizes output per unit of labor (or income per capita). In a competitive 
economy with flawless market institutions, the forces of supply and demand 
spontaneously establish global equilibrium involving optimal value for . If for some 
reason the autonomous increase in  would come to an end, in Solow growth models 
the assumption of sharply diminishing marginal product of capital takes away the 
possibility of propelling long-term growth of  via capital accumulation (by steadily 
raising ). Finally, Solow’s growth theory is admired for its formal elegance and bold 
predictions, particularly the famous convergence hypothesis, which states that in the 
long run, regardless of their starting points, all economies will converge on the same 
per-capita income, , and realize the same steady-state rate of growth. 
It is well known that in modern times economic growth has not equalized living 
standards around the world but instead opened an extraordinary income gap 
between rich and poor countries.  If at time  all countries share the same technology, 
, as the Solow model assumes, in theory differences in incomes per capita must be 
caused by country differences in the capital-labor ratio, . In practice, we cannot use 
the variation between countries in  ratios to explain the income gap. Given a range 
of values for  in equation (1) that is empirically reasonable, differences in  between 
rich and poor countries can only be explained by assuming absurdly large 
differences in their capital-labor ratio,  (Romer, 1994). We therefore must either 
throw away the Solow approach or modify the assumption that all countries share 
the same . But now we have a new problem. Neoclassical growth theory assumes 
that , technical knowledge, is a pure public good that is instantly available to all 
nations. To escape the quandary we can recognize  as having many attributes of an 
international public good (non-excludable and non-rival) but as being strongly 
dependent for its effects upon specific complementary goods: appropriate social 
institution. Moreover, we can argue that, unlike , social institutions are generally 
local public goods with weak international public goods properties.3 Along these 
lines, in a recent book I distinguish between social technologies and production 
technologies (Eggertsson, 2005). The concept “social technologies” refers to 
knowledge or understanding of the social mechanisms that give institutions their 
properties. Social institutions are bundles containing several elements: formal rules, 
social norms, beliefs, and enforcement mechanisms. The term “social technologies” 
implies knowledge of how institutions emerge, how they function and how they 
change (spontaneously or by design). It is fair to say that we have more knowledge 
of physical technologies than social technologies, and in the domain of social 
technologies we know more about static than dynamic properties of institutions. We 
know more about the market response to harvest failures than about the path from 
insecure to secure property rights. 
                                                 
3  For instance, shared history and common characteristics make it relatively easy for the 
Scandinavian countries to import laws and regulations from each other. Countries far 
away from the Scandinavian perimeter, however, would find it harder to import the same 
bundles of rules and enforcement mechanisms and put them to effective use. 
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In sum: Long-term increase in  is the basic source of a sustained rise in living 
standards but only when new production techniques are supported by 
complementary social institutions—and therefore by appropriate incentives. The 
application of new production techniques usually requires investment in physical 
and human capital, which will not be forthcoming in the absence of secure property 
rights, enforceable contracts, and supportive organizations. Moreover, appropriate 
institutions and incentives are required for creating new knowledge. New 
knowledge and new methods of production are scarce assets that are costly to 
produce. Also, it is important to note that new knowledge, even new technical 
knowledge, is not always wealth augmenting. For instance, social institutions that 
create incentives to develop technologies for capturing resources through theft or 
warfare do not contribute to economic growth (at least not directly). Finally, it is fair 
to say that the economics of knowledge is one of the least developed branches of our 
science. In economic theory,  has a long history of being a nondescript exogenous 
variable.4 
Social Organization and  
A, physical technology, is a critical input both in the traditional processes of 
producing commodities as well as in the production of institutions such as secure 
property rights or enforceable contracts. At the risk of oversimplifying we can write  
   (2) 
In equation (2) each symbol represents a vector of variables. The letter  stands for 
the set of technically available forms of social institutions or organization,  
represents physical knowledge and technologies,  social knowledge and social 
technologies, and  stands for various background factors such as geography and 
natural resources. Equation (2) defines the choice set of institutional forms that are 
theoretically available to a particular community.5 Communities select or acquire a 
set of social institutions, , that belongs to the larger  set. The empirical evidence 
does not give us reasons to think that communities or nations optimize in the sense 
of always selecting the wealth-maximizing subset  from . Various forces intervene, 
such as failures of collective action, narrow self-interests of ruling groups, beliefs, 
values and cognitive limitations. We argue, however, that , the choice set of 
institutions, becomes larger as  increases. It follows that a social group that only 
                                                 
4  Relatively few mainstream economists have extensively studied economics of science, 
knowledge, and technological change whereas these topics appear to be more popular 
among evolutionary economists (Nelson & Winter 1982).  Fritz Machlup (1962), a 
mainstream economist, is a classic reference. In addition to Machlup, the small but 
distinguished set of economists exploring the economics of knowledge contains, for 
instance, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Friedrich A. Hayek, Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Herbert A. Simon, and Paul A. David. So-called new or endogenous growth theory 
attempts to make  endogenous in macroeconomic growth models. To my knowledge, the 
new growth literature has not yet produced important new insights into the nature of —
perhaps because macroeconomic models are not a productive venue for studying the 
phenomenon (Nelson 1997). 
5  The simple formulation in equation (2) does not recognize that the choice of new 
institutions is constrained by already prevailing institutions, including formal rules and 
social norms. 
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knows and uses primitive physical technologies has relatively few choices when it 
comes to institutions. 
Let us consider in some detail the case of primitive, isolated and preliterate farming 
societies. In such societies the capacity to organize is critically constrained by the 
limited availability of physical technologies of communication, measurement, 
monitoring and enforcement. Primitive societies that have a long history of survival 
are likely to have set up relatively efficient social institutions, , given their small  
set, because the opportunity cost of inefficient institutions is high. Primitive societies 
live close to extinction and nature filters out the most inefficient ones. In a thoughtful 
essay Richard A. Posner (1980) works his way through organizational forms that are 
likely to be available in traditional societies with no written records, scant knowledge 
of the laws of nature, and access to only the most elementary techniques of farming 
and agriculture. In an ideal-type primitive society, he asks, what social institutions 
do we expect to find in the spheres of politics, property rights, insurance against 
hunger, protection of order, economic exchange and religion? Posner then appeals to 
high information and transaction costs to explain why preliterate and low-  societies 
usually are stateless, lack specialized organizations such as firms and government 
bureaus, are elaborately organized into clans, rely on communal property rights, 
strict liability in torts, gift exchanges, joint or interrelated institutions for production, 
government, and religion, and even have institutions that block the accumulation of 
surpluses by fortunate individuals. 
Hull & Bold (1994) use an approach similar to Posner (1980) to explore the structure 
of religion in primitive societies, particularly their reliance on the promise of heaven 
and the threat of hell as social mechanisms for maintaining public order. In the 
production of social order, Hull and Bold assume diminishing returns to both threats 
and promises and hypothesize that primitive societies with relatively weak worldly 
governance mechanisms rely heavily on religion to maintain order, evoking both 
heaven and hell because of diminishing returns to each method. Societies with more 
advanced administrative control mechanisms rely either on heaven or hell, not on 
both. Hull and Bold (1994) then find statistical support for their thesis in an empirical 
test using data drawn from preliterate communities. 
We conclude by suggesting two related explanations of the relatively high variance 
in , , and  across countries in modern times. First, the emergence of growth-
compatible  (social institutions) is associated with the separation of political and 
economic institutions to a degree where (a large segment of) the population is free to 
enter (almost) all economic activities and compete in the economic sphere. In history, 
the alternative arrangement is for the rulers, in payment for political support, to 
allocate economic opportunities and monopoly rights directly to a small minority, 
the leading members of the rulers’ winning coalition. Successful economic reforms 
require opening access to the economic sphere and providing investors with fairly 
secure rights. Second, reformers who rapidly overcome political barriers and attempt 
to move quickly by importing modern  and growth-friendly  come up against 
complementarities at two levels: the dependence of high-level  on appropriate ; 
and, within the -set, the dependence of imported formal institutions on preexisting 
local institutions, particularly on informal institutions or social norms. Imported 
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constitutional, commercial, contract, and corporation laws tend to be dysfunctional 
unless supported by social norms involving legitimacy, trust, reciprocity, and basic 
standards of honesty. Informal institutions are rooted in history and do not adjust 
automatically to rapid changes in the environment. 
In sum: Moves to qualitatively different new political equilibrium are associated with 
major changes in political power; and the social mechanisms governing rapid 
changes in social norms are poorly understood. The political balance and social 
norms are usually outside the reach of economic reformers (Eggertsson 2005). 
A. Smith and the British  Revolution 
The consensus on the critical role of  in economic progress has not stimulated 
comparably great interest among researchers in the economics of knowledge. In fact 
economists (and others) are not particularly good at recognizing industrial 
revolutions in their early stages. 6  We do best when predicting technological 
watersheds after the fact because the consequences of general-purpose technologies, 
such as steam power, electricity or electronics, are essentially unforeseen or 
unforeseeable. Revolutionary general-purpose technologies reshape production 
methods, economic institutions (rules and norms), economic organizations (the 
structure of firms and contracts) and our life styles, but these transformations occur 
gradually and sequentially. At the outset, most travelers cannot see whither their 
path will lead.   
Adam Smith first published his Wealth of Nations in 1776. The third revised edition 
of the book appeared in 1782, the year in which, according to the English economic 
historian Thomas S. Ashton (1997 [1964]), the pace of output in England quickened, 
ushering in the British Industrial Revolution. Yet the Industrial Revolution does not 
play a role in Smith’s masterpiece (Koebner 1959). Smith apparently did not foresee 
the rise of British industry driven by mechanization of production and transport; he 
was not a prophet of entrepreneurship and industrialization. Unlike Schumpeter 
writing some 150 years later, Smith was doubtful about the contribution of daring 
industrial innovators and entrepreneurs, referring to them as speculators and 
projectors (Koebner 1959). If we want to give Smith the benefit of doubt, it is possible 
(but unlikely), that he understood the significance of contemporary industrial 
developments but for strategic reasons decided to ignore them.  Smith’s practical aim 
with the Wealth of Nations was to lay bare the economic weaknesses of the 
Mercantile System and promote the use of free markets. Speculations about an 
industrial revolution could have complicated his message. Smith’s well-known 
argument is that economic freedom increases the size of markets, promotes 
specialization, raises productivity (the pin example), and improves the standard of 
living. Taking A as given, Smith’s eyes were on complementary social institutions 
and organizations.  
                                                 
6  Few issues receive greater attention in modern economic theory than the relative efficiency 
of various market structures but theory usually assumes stationary A when analyzing 
various mechanisms for allocating resources. The mainstream literature recognizes as such 
the concept of “dynamic efficiency,” sometimes with a nod toward Joseph Schumpeter 
(2005, [1939]), who in his work explored the dynamics of capitalism. Yet it is fair to say 
that dynamic efficiency plays a trivial role in modern mainstream economic analysis. 
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, the Enlightenment, and Modern Economic Growth 
DNA evidence indicates that humans emerged in Africa, perhaps some 200,000 years 
ago. Modern production technology and modern economic growth span the last 200 
years or thereabouts, which equals approximately only 0.125 percent of mankind’s 
time on earth. We know also that in the second half of the 17th Century in Western 
Europe the stock of useful knowledge, the source of modern production technology, 
started to expand rapidly and has since then grown at an accelerating rate. Why did 
this happen? Why in Western Europe? 
Joel Mokyr (2005a, 2005b), the distinguished economic historian who specializes in 
the history of knowledge and the British Industrial Revolution, associates the rapid 
expansion in the stock of useful knowledge during the late 17th and 18th centuries 
with the Age of Enlightenment in Europe. If new production technology is to emerge 
and spread rapidly within a large geographical area, two conditions are required: (a) 
emergence of strong incentives for producing useful knowledge, and (b) falling costs 
of accessing and disseminating new knowledge. Mokyr finds evidence that both 
conditions were present during the Enlightenment in the latter half of the 17th and 
18th Centuries.7 The period saw the gradual redirection of a significant component the 
West European research program away from knowledge for its own sake with 
emphasis on theological and metaphysical issues toward knowledge useful for 
solving practical problems and raising living standards. The work and ideas of Sir 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) symbolize the redirection of research toward modern 
science and technical change. Yet ideological incentives are only one part of the story. 
A scientific revolution also requires political conditions that do not punish but 
actually encourage those who seek practical knowledge. The travails of Galileo 
Galilei (1564-1642) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) are cases in point. We discuss the 
political environment below.  
The latter of the two requirements is low costs of accessing new knowledge. Mokyr 
(2005a) documents how in the 17th Century various methods for codifying and 
storing knowledge and information began to appear. The Age of Enlightenment saw 
a rapid increase in the publication of scientific pamphlets and periodicals; the 
evolution of informal networks of scholars; and the establishment of formal science 
academies, the first national academy being the Royal Society of London for the 
Improvement of Natural Knowledge, established 1660, and the second the Académie 
des sciences in Paris founded in 1666 by Louis XIV. Figure 1 reproduces one of the 
many indicators that Mokyr presents in support of his thesis: Scientific periodicals in 
Europe by year of first appearance.  
                                                 
7  Many scholars refer to the 17th Century in Europe as Age of Reason and the 18th Century as 
Age of Enlightenment. Others, as is done here, use the term Age of Enlightenment to 
represent the entire two hundred year period. 
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Figure 1. Intellectual Origins. 
 
Source: Computed from Kronic, Scientific and Technical Periodicals. 
Figure 1 shows that until around 1650 virtually no scientific periodicals had 
appeared; in the period 1741-50 approximately 100 new periodicals appear; and 
during the years 1791-1800 the number of new periodicals exceeds 500. 
The evidence is hardly in doubt. Several reliable indicators show that in Western 
Europe during the Age of Enlightenment the production of useful knowledge surged 
and the costs of access fell. We have already mentioned the symbolic role of Francis 
Bacon in emphasizing useful knowledge. Yet an important issue remains 
unexamined: the political dimension. Why did the ruling elites of Western Europe 
tolerate relatively free scientific inquiry? In history, powerful rulers have been wary 
of new ideas about the social, spiritual and physical worlds and tried to control or 
repress scholarship. The rulers fear with some reason that unbridled new ideas may 
undermine the status quo and challenge their authority. What developments then 
opened a window of opportunity for independent scholarship in Western Europe in 
the late 17th and 18th Centuries? Mokyr (2005b) finds the answer in the political 
fragmentation of the region.  
In this period Western Europe was politically fragmented and without an 
overarching and synchronizing center of power because of the diminished role of the 
Catholic Church.8 With central authority absent, intellectuals and scholars who felt 
threatened by their local authorities had the option of moving between political units 
and playing one regime against another. Again Mokyr (2005b) presents data, now 
recording the movement of European intellectuals and scholars between European 
                                                 
8  For instance, when Germany under the leadership of Prussia emerged as a nation state in 
1871, it was through the unification of 39 independent states. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Before 1651 1671/80 1701/10 1731/40 1761/70 1791/1800
Scientific Periodicals by Year of First Appearance
26 Tímarit um viðskipti og efnahagsmál, Special Issue 2008 
political units during the Enlightenment period. The data show high rates of mobility 
of scholars between European centers of learning but toward the end of the period 
mobility rates appear to fall in spite of a sharp reduction in transportation costs. 
Mokyr associates the decline in mobility with a gradual increase in the tolerance of 
new ideas in Western Europe, which would have lowered the demand for political 
refuge.9 
The exponential rise of science and useful knowledge during the Enlightenment is 
often associated with the social norm of “open science”, which emerged in this 
period, replacing the institution of secrecy, which was the dominant strategy of 
medieval craft guilds as well as of scholars in general.10 The economic rationale of 
secrecy was comparable to the motives behind the current phenomenon of trade 
secrets: they are attempts to privatize or internalize knowledge. The term “open 
science” involves the practice of pursuing knowledge for its own sake (rather than 
for strategic motives), sharing findings with other members of the scholarly 
community, and submitting findings to peer reviews. Using my term, open science is 
a social technology with a history of being effective mechanism for organizing the 
production of scientific knowledge. Paul David (2007), the distinguished expert on 
the economics of science and technology, offers an interesting explanation of the 
historical origins of open science, which overlaps partly with Mokyr’s (2005b) study 
of the intellectual origins of modern economic growth. Once again the argument 
centers on political fragmentation in early modern Europe, but David focuses his 
explanation on competition among princes and elites who sought prestige by 
surrounding themselves at court with artists, writers and scholars. A brief account of 
David’s elaborate thesis must necessarily leave out many of his theoretical arguments 
and historical detail, including an elaborate explanation of the emergence in the late 
17th Century of formal scholarly societies and academies. His main argument, 
however, focuses on information asymmetry and problems of agency in the 
relationship between scientists or natural philosophers and their elite patrons. 
The 16th and 17th Centuries saw explosive growth in mathematical ideas. Leading 
scholars became increasingly involved with basic research in mathematics, which 
advanced rapidly, and moreover, natural scientists came to favor the language of 
mathematics in their studies. These producers of a public good, knowledge, needed 
somehow to make a living and the evolving system of court-patronage of the arts 
and sciences was a major source of support. In fragmented Western Europe 
competition among the princes for respect and awe took many forms. The princes 
built magnificent palaces and public buildings; they supported sculptors, painters 
and musicians and displayed their art; and they served as patrons to the prominent 
scientists of the day. However, the new math aggravated the information asymmetry 
between scientists and their patrons. The princes and their advisers were incapable 
                                                 
9  Greater tolerance of scholars toward the end of the period could be related to rising 
opportunity cost of oppressing science and technology as the value of new discoveries 
steadily increased and became more obvious. 
10  Robert K. Merton (1973) in his book The Sociology of Science provides a classic analysis of 
the social norms that govern open science in an ideal world. He identifies four norms: 
universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. 
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of evaluating scholars who used complex mathematics, which meant for the elites 
that their risk of offering patronage to charlatans had substantially increased.11 David 
(2007) theorizes that the social norm of open science and peer review emerged to ease 
the measurement problem of overseeing scholars. Facing serious problems in 
measuring directly the quality of scholarly services, the elites were willing to support 
the norm of open science and rely (at least partly) on indirect measurement by the 
scholarly community or peer review. Yet direct measurement did not entirely 
disappear. The circumstances sometimes permitted the rulers to get direct 
impressions of the importance of scientific findings. David (2007) cites the case of 
Galileo Galilei who advanced his career by strategically presenting rulers with 
powerful telescopes, a new invention, so they could see for themselves. It has even 
been suggested that Galileo’s troubles with the church were brought on not only by 
the Jesuit Order but also by fellow professors who were jealous of Galileo’s 
aggressive pursuit of patrons and his successful career moves (David 2007, 44-49; 
Westfall 1985). 
The Mokyr mechanism for allowing scholars to avoid political repression and the 
David mechanism for lowering the cost of agency are not mutually exclusive 
explanations of the rise of ; in fact the two explanations reinforce each other. Not all 
rulers would see scholar  or discovery  as a threat to their regime; scholars who 
felt threatened could exploit the elites’ competition for prestige and move to a 
friendly jurisdiction; open science and peer review made it easier for a prince to 
evaluate immigrating scholars. 
For more than three centuries the accumulation of useful or practical knowledge in 
the Western World has been a monotonic process; we have neither seen stagnation 
nor reversals that were common in earlier historical settings, for instance in China. 
Various factors have prevented major reversals: the codification of knowledge 
through various means, its diffuse possession, competition, and the Western 
entrepreneurial spirit. David (2007) and Mokyr (2005) both recognize that if their 
speculations are correct, namely that the  revolution in Western Europe is rooted in 
political fragmentation prior to the consolidation of the nation state, modern 
prosperity is a delayed gift to the modern era by West European feudalism and the 
ruins of the Roman Empire. 
The steady increase in  has raised living standards in a major way but only for one 
segment of the human population, the inhabitants of the industrial countries. The 
gap between rich and poor countries is a measure of our limited knowledge and 
control of social technologies. Relative to the growth in , social science knowledge 
has grown at a modest pace in the last 300 years. We understand only imperfectly 
how power politics and inhospitable social institutions block economic progress and 
make some countries fall behind. Even less is known about appropriate social 
technologies for reforming imperfect institutions and neutralizing destructive 
                                                 
11  Scientists were also hired for outright practical purposes. They were sought for technical 
contributions or problem solving, for instance, in military engineering, hydraulic 
engineering (canals, irrigation systems, aqueducts), navigation, and the new scientific 
cartography. Information asymmetry between agents and patrons was also increasing in 
practical applications of science (David, 2007). 
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political systems. There is a fundamental uncertainty about possibilities and limits of 
reform. 
Fickle, Flighty : Lessons from the Second Industrial Revolution 1860-1900 
In this section I discuss two important lessons from the Second Industrial Revolution. 
First I briefly introduce the dramatic experience of England toward the end of the 19th 
Century when the country lost its industrial leadership. The other lesson concerns 
the uncertain and delayed impact of general-purpose technologies caused by time 
lags in discovering and implementing useful applications. Electricity and digital 
electronics are prime examples of general-purpose technologies, representing two 
different epochs. 
To maintain worldwide leadership in  over a span of several generations a country 
requires not only foresight but also and above all adaptable social institutions. In the 
early stages of an industrial and technological revolution special interests typically 
emerge and gradually acquire enough power and authority to safeguard the status 
quo. These forces see it in their interest to oppose new industrial developments that 
could undermine their economic base. Economic success can also make the political 
and industrial leadership of a country complacent and inattentive to new 
opportunities. During the so-called Second Industrial Revolution 1860-1914, social 
rigidities and complacency swiftly and unexpectedly deprived England of its 
leadership in  and gave it to Germany and the United States. 
Consider the new chemical industries that played a critical role in the Second 
Industrial Revolution. Alfred DuPont Chandler, Jr. (1992), sometimes considered the 
father of modern business history, has examined how England lost its leadership in 
synthetic dyes. British scientists and entrepreneurs pioneered the technology for 
synthetic dyes and the huge British textile industry was the largest market in the 
world for dyes. The production of synthetic dyes required high quality coal and 
Britain was the largest supplier in Europe of this input. In the 1870s the new dye 
industry in Britain had almost every advantage. Germany, however, was more 
flexible, relying on foresighted cooperation between industry, government and 
technical universities. The provision of appropriate technical education was one of 
the key elements in Germany’s success; novel business organization (new social 
technology) was another. By 1900 the leadership in synthetic dyes had moved to 
Germany. In 1913 some 160,000 tons of dyes were produced worldwide. Thereof 
German firms made 140,000 tons or 88 percent. The British produced only 4,100 tons 
(Chandler 1992, 90-91). The synthetic dyes story and countless similar lessons tell us 
that  is a fickle visitor. 
Industrial revolutions involve both limited-purpose and general-purpose 
technologies. The discovery of potential applications of new general-purpose 
technologies and their implementation is a long process that usually spans decades. 
The lags between invention and application are caused by many factors, including 
long and uncertain learning processes, high adjustment costs, and perhaps mental 
inertia. Electric power, a general-purpose technology, is the symbol of the Second 
Industrial Revolution. Historians of electricity have established that in the United 
States it took about half a century of innovations and costly investments before 
electricity had made its full impact on productivity. For instance, prior to 
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electrification factories relied on the power of water or steam, which usually 
involved a centralized power source. Electric power made it often efficient for 
factories to equip each machine with its own electric motor, which provided 
opportunities for reorganizing the entire layout of the production process. The 
adjustments could be very costly, requiring new factory buildings and major learning 
and training efforts by management and workers (Devine, 1983; David, 1990).  
Whither ? Are we in the early stages of a new industrial revolution? 
The last half of the 20th century saw major innovations that include both specific and 
general-purpose technologies. It is often said that new information and 
communication technology is the symbol of our era but, as often before, we do not 
really know where we are heading. Are we at the dawn of an economic revolution, 
somewhat like the innocent Adam Smith was at the end of the 18th century, or is 
recent talk about the Knowledge Economy only empty words? Robert Solow (1987, 
2002) has said: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics.”12 Was he right? 
History tells us that the impact of an  revolution is not limited to raising , average 
output per worker. Revolutionary new technology lowers costs and raises the quality 
of many existing products, gives us new goods and services, and transforms the 
organization of business, politics, and social affairs. The new information technology 
gathered momentum in the last decades of the 20th Century and is gradually 
transforming a variety of products and industries, ranging from automobiles to 
biotechnology. The distinguished economist Robert Gordon (2000) argues that recent 
changes in  are qualitatively less significant than the inventions of the Second 
Industrial Revolutions, 1860-1914, which profoundly changed living conditions in 
the West with novelties such as electricity, the telephone, radio, and the internal 
combustion engine. Is Gordon right? Can he forecast what innovations in 
commodities and organization the next half-century will bring? I doubt it. In fact, 
economists and other social scientists can do little more than speculate about 
marginal changes in technologies, products, and organization. In recent decades 
various studies have emerged that tentatively examine implications of the new 
information technology. I conclude by introducing a few research questions that the 
new  has inspired. 
In advanced industrial countries the structure of property rights is usually clearly 
defined, well enforced and relatively efficient. Major technological change, however, 
may require substantial revision of property rights in significant sectors of the 
economy; adjustments to new and uncertain circumstances that often involve trial by 
error. Intellectual assets are non-rival in use; they often involve huge fixed or set-up 
costs (for instance genetics-based drugs or computer software) but low (often close to 
zero) marginal costs of reproduction. An optimal regime for intellectual property 
must solve a complicated dilemma: to create incentives for the inventors of 
knowledge assets, for instance through patents (monopoly rights), and also secure 
                                                 
12  Solow made this famous statement in New York Review of Books on July 12 1987. In a 2002 
interview in The Region, a publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Solow 
had not changed his mind. 
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efficient allocation of the knowledge assets through pricing close to marginal costs 
(competitive conditions). Posner (2005) argues convincingly that the task of creating 
optimal regime for intellectual property goes far beyond our cognitive capacities.13 
Posner is more optimistic about the capacity of scholars to evaluate marginal changes 
in intellectual property regimes: whether particular changes are likely to increase or 
decrease the efficiency of the system.  
The recent extension of patents to basic research, even to research undertaken in 
laboratories at publicly funded universities, has created intense controversy among 
experts. The critics of recent laws extending patent rights claim that over-patenting 
will create anticommons effects, a problem that is symmetric to the well-known open 
commons effects that involve waste through over-utilization of resources (Eisenberg 
and Heller, 1998; Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). The anticommons condition involves 
excessive property rights and occurs when a large number of owners hold various 
rights to the same asset and potential users cannot make efficient use of the resource 
because of high transaction costs in acquiring the necessary rights.14 In theory and 
depending on the cost of transacting, it is sometimes possible for firms to act 
strategically and limit the anticommons effects of new laws and regulations. The 
literature provides evidence of firms in the biotechnology industry that have actually 
invested in antiproperty by organizing open access commons for patentable findings 
in their sector, particularly for potential inputs located upstream in the production 
chain (Merges, 2004). 
Rapid technical change can also challenge the system of property rights by suddenly 
creating strong demand for resources that until recently had little commercial value 
and were therefore not subject to clearly specified property rights. In these situations 
new legislation or judicial rulings often have vast implications for new industries, 
and those implications are not always well understood ex ante. The biogenetics 
industry, it is often claimed, owes its existence in no small part to divided court 
decisions concerning ownership of biological materials.15 
Network industries with scale economies on the demand side are relatively common 
among the new growth industries (Varian, Farrell, & Shapiro, 2005). With strong 
demand-side economies of scale, the demand curve for the output has initially an 
upward slope because the commodity becomes more valuable as more customers use 
it. These conditions hold for computer operating systems but also for fax machines. 
Economic analysis shows that in network industries welfare may fall as the number 
of new entrants increases, if the products of the various firms are incompatible in 
use. In these industries competition for the market becomes more important for 
welfare than competition in the market. Standardization is also a question of great 
                                                 
13  An optimal intellectual property regime would probably require a large number of 
subsystems designed separately for each type of knowledge assets. 
14  Heller (1998) was the first to develop the anticommons concept in a paper entitled “The 
Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” In 
developing the concept, Heller was inspired by the puzzle of empty storefronts and full 
kiosks in Moscow during the early and mid-1990s. 
15  See essays by various authors in Ginsburg and Dreyfuss eds. (2006), Intellectual Property 
Stories. 
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importance. The special features of the new network industries seem to call for some 
rethinking of standard competition and antitrust policy (Economides, 2006). 
The economics of Internet markets is an emerging field of research (Ellison and 
Ellison, 2005). It is reasonable to ask, for instance, whether exchange on the Internet 
or exchange in the regular market place more resembles the model of perfect 
competition. We may also want to know whether Internet marketing is likely to 
enable fine-tuned price discrimination or whether through anonymity it protects 
buyers who belong to social groups that traditionally pay relatively high prices, for 
instance for new automobiles or groceries. When combined with the Internet, 
digitalization of music, pictures and printed matter creates a whole range of issues 
concerning adjustments in property rights and business organization. The new 
technology has rekindled passionate debates about private, public and communal 
ownership, a common theme during the Second Industrial Revolution, although now 
the debate focuses on knowledge assets and not on coal and steel factories. Many 
scholars worry about privacy issues; whether digital technology in the hands of the 
state or large corporations will eventually undermine our privacy and freedom 
(Benkler, 2006). Concurrently, diligent bloggers invite the world into their personal 
life. 
The new technology also raises new questions in economic geography, for instance 
about urbanization and location of industry. The British Industrial Revolution 
introduced centralized manufacturing plants; for most people it separated the home 
from the workplace; and it moved workers from rural areas into urban centers, 
depopulating the countryside. Theoretically the new information and 
communications technology may gradually reverse the urbanization trend and send 
substantial part of the workforce back home and into rural areas, away from the 
cities. Relocation to the home and away from offices, factories and other external 
work places is an efficient alternative only for workers who can work at home 
approximately as effectively as they now do in centralized workplaces. Such 
relocation is obviously not an option for all job categories; for instance, most service 
employees cannot work at home. For potential home workers the critical question is 
whether new communication technologies, such as the Internet and video 
conferencing, substitute effectively for the synergy of direct contacts when joint tasks 
are involved (Leamer & Storper, 2001). The answer depends on the psychology of 
learning and group dynamics but also on the quality of the communications 
technology, social norms and the nature of joint tasks.16 Those who are able and 
willing to work at home may or may not desire to relocate outside major urban areas. 
The decision to leave the city depends in part on how the new communication 
technology affects the relative costs and benefits of living (and consuming) in rural 
and urban areas. The Internet, for instance, can provide various forms of 
entertainment in remote areas but it can also make consuming in the city more 
efficient and enjoyable, for instance through homepages of restaurants, theaters, and 
specialty stores (Sinai & Waldfogel, 2003). Finally, the new technology affects 
economic geography on a global scale by lowering the cost of outsourcing across 
                                                 
16  The new technology raises of course questions about reorganization of education and the 
extent to which the new communications technology can effectively replace the classroom. 
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national borders. The economic, political and social consequences of the recent 
Globalization are only partly understood. 
Conclusion 
The unbearable lightness of  blurs our vision of the road ahead. We can see the big 
picture only when looking back and then not very clearly. Yet it is obvious, to cite the 
Chinese, that we live in interesting times. 
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